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each way suggests appropriate methodologies. 1 But my concern in this essay 
is primarily with art as an institution—or as a group of institutions—and 
I propose to sketch out a tentative method for this approach, one which 
sees the arts as a group of institutions among many and which may be used 
to get at basic cultural values. 
The approach to arts , values, institutions and culture which I am going 
to outline is by no means original to m e . 2 1 like to think that it is the result 
of a process which ought to work upon any scholar involved in an inter-
disciplinary field. I work with many students and colleagues trained in 
'Several may be briefly listed: 1) A r t - a s - p r o p h e c y . For all that social scientist friends 
scoff at the idea, I believe that artists sometimes sense directions in which things are going 
before the rest of us do. The method suggested is simple chronicling, using anecdotal evi-
dence. Such evidence, of course, can't prove that art foreshadows change (art may, after 
all, help cause change), but it can prove that change is rapid, common and expected in our 
society. The fact that the process would not work as well in cultures which change less 
rapidly, or in which the artist is less differentiated from his fellows, is in itself significant. 
2) Arts-as-artifact. The method one uses to read artifacts is archaeological, and procedures 
are firmly established. 3) Art as a source of data about language, human relations, social 
structures, about what Edward Hall calls "silent l a n g u a g e " (The Silent Language, New 
York: Doubleday, 1959), and about basic story-types which tell us how experience is or-
ganized or perceived ("myth" is not too strong a word for such patterns). Such data are most 
readily obtained from substantive arts; the basic method used is content analysis, though 
other methods will work providing the end is sechel, not aesthetic evaluation. 
2 To some extent, for instance, my line of reasoning has been influenced by students 
who took their cue from Richard E. Sykes' article "American Studies and the Concept of 
Culture: A Theory and Method" (American Quarterly, 15 [Summer 1963], 253-70), which 
I hadn't read myself until very recently. 
132 American Quarterly 
fields very different from those in which I was trained, and over the years 
they have gradually pushed me in the direction in which this paper goes. 
I in turn have pressed them to try out the ideas we had arrived at on 
more and more evidence. And for the past two years I have brought our 
tentative conclusions to the attention of colleagues at scholarly conventions, 
to see whether the hypotheses which my students and I have gradually 
developed seemed useful to them. 3 Colleagues urged me to put these ideas 
together in some accessible place, and that is the real reason behind the 
present essay. 
It is probably worth mentioning that on both occasions in which I pre-
sented these ideas, some people in the room misunderstood them, tak-
ing them to be an attack on the elite arts, a kind of cynical and even snide 
put-down of humanists on the part of a social scientist dabbling in the arts. 
That is not what I intend at all. If my readers will excuse a little confes-
sional material, let me say that I have no training in the social sciences 
beyond what my students have taught me, that for many years I made my 
living teaching American literature and the history of American painting, 
that I also have training in American architecture and American music, 
and that for a number of years before entering the academic world I sup-
ported myself as a professional concert musician. I still love all these arts, 
still perform from time to time, still spend happy hours in museums and 
concert halls. 
Very often in American Studies one finds oneself, at last, engaged in 
analysis of one's own feelings and values. That is as it should be. On the one 
hand, one wants the kind of detachment which an outsider to our culture 
would bring to a study of the United States; on the other hand, one has 
advantages in studying it which he will never have, the results of a life-
time of living as an American, increasingly sensitive to all manner of 
nuances, social cues and associations, which, taken together, form a kind 
of cultural code almost impossible for an outsider to crack. Ideally one 
wants both familiarity and detachment. Thus if, in this essay, I point out 
that an art, let us say, is valued partly for reasons which are not cosmic 
truths, but are rather the result of certain peculiarities in the way in which 
our culture operates, this does not mean that I do not myself value the 
art. I find, on the contrary, that I carry many of the values described in 
this essay. But I refuse to believe that it is bad to attain sufficient detach-
ment from them to recognize them for what they are—attitudes I hold, 
values by which I make judgments, but not necessarily universal truths. 
^Towards a General Theory of Elite Art and Culture," paper delivered at the second 
national meeting of the American Studies Association, Toledo, Ohio, Oct. 1969; informal 
remarks delivered during an open discussion of the arts at the 20th Annual Meeting of the 
Midcontinent American Studies Association, March 1970. 
Arts, Values, Institutions and Culture 133 
A Model for Institutions, Value Systems and Artifacts: Let us begin by 
playing social scientist and talking about the relationships indicated in 
Figure 1. If this chart is read from left to right, the movement represents a 
progression from characteristics which are true of all people down to the 
specific things which people in a given culture or subculture actually pro-
duce. You will note that the left side of the figure is labeled, "Universals 
about Human Nature—from Psychology, Philosophy, Religion, etc. 1 ' 
I have deliberately left matters vague because what I have in mind 
throughout this paper is not imposing my thinking on anyone, but rather 
providing a framework for the thinking of others. All that I mean by that 
left-hand side of the chart is, "Whatever you feel is universally true about 
people." This means all people, not just Americans or people in western 
culture in general. Given readers might feel that their opinions are rooted 
in biology, psychology, philosophy, religion or, more likely, a combination 
of such fields. The arts themselves might very well be included; many 
teachers of literature, for instance, feel that it is preferable to science or 
social science as a source of information about what all people are. I 
would only urge that a reader who wants to make use of this diagram 
be sure that his definition of basic human characteristics is sufficiently 
universal to cover all people, and not merely people in our culture, or in 
closely related cultures. 
Hunger and sexual drive, I would imagine, would be present, along with 
certain other "basic" factors, on everyone's list of behavioral determi-
nants. They seem to be human, not cultural. Certain others might be pres-
ent or not, depending upon the observer's opinion. For instance, the two 
recent popularizing books of Robert Ardrey 4 have convinced many peo-
ple that territoriality and the need for violence are universal human char-
acteristics. If one agrees, those determinants would go on the list. If one 
disagrees, they would not. Their presence could affect the way one used 
the entire scheme represented by Figure l. 
Moving to the right, we come to institutions. At this point we have left 
the realm of "things that are true of all people" and entered, so to speak, 
the United States. Here again I want to allow the reader as much leeway as 
possible in deciding which institutions he might want to list, and about 
how "institution" is to be defined. Indeed, I hestitate to use the word "in-
stitution" because it has a fairly clear and precise meaning to social scien-
tists, a meaning rather more limited than what I intend. I want to leave 
the way open to examine not only the institution as a whole, but also any 
functioning portion of it, or even an individual operating in a role defined 
4Robert Ardrey, The Territorial Imperative (New York: Atheneum, 1966); The 
Social Contract (New York: Atheneum, I970). 
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INSTITUTIONS VALUE-SYSTEMS ARTIFACTS 
1) Values peculiar to 
the institution (based 
on what it does) 
2) Values related to 
Universa Is" (based 
on what people are) 
3) Values shared by x 
other institutions 
(based on the culture) 
B 
Those values which keep recurring are tentatively labeled "sacred. 
Figure 1. Institutions, Values and Sacred Values. 
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by it. I think that the scheme is flexible enough, for example, so that if 
one wanted to use Institution A to represent, let us say, "industry," this 
would be fine; it would also be all right to interpret it in a much more 
specific way, so that Institution A means "the food industry," "a given 
cannery in a given city" or even "the Board of Directors of a given cannery 
in a given city." So, in utilizing this scheme, one could fill in the blank space 
represented by the square labeled "Institution A" with headings as different 
as "the family" or a specific family; "government" or a specific part of 
government; "Higher education" or a specific institution of higher educa-
tion, a specific portion of that institution or even a given class taught by a 
specific professor to a group of specific students and covering some specific 
material. I am aware that such a class is not what a sociologist would 
call an institution. "Education" or "higher education" perhaps would fit 
his definition better, and the specific class would simply be an organized 
subdivision functioning within the larger institution. But I am going to call 
it an institution anyway, because it reveals values, produces artifacts 
and might, in a given instance, be easier to analyze than higher education 
as a whole. 
It will be noted that one can say something about the relationship be-
tween institutions and the universal characteristics of human nature at the 
left of the chart. For example, should we really want to discuss a cannery, 
we know that canneries can food, and that philosophers, psychologists and 
theologians would all agree that all people have to eat. Other basic human 
characteristics might also be represented in the cannery. If you have been 
reading Reinhold Niebuhr recently, for example, you might believe that 
"the will to create" and " the will to power" are basic components of 
human nature, and you might see both operating, in the ambiguous and 
overlapping manner which Niebuhr describes, in the person, let us say, 
of a given administrator of the factory. 
But two observers might disagree about the relationship between basic 
drives and institutions. If you are examining an organized sport, and feel 
that it reflects the competitiveness of the society, that competitiveness 
would seem to be cultural. But if, on the other hand, you feel that all people 
are by nature competitive, then the sport might seem to be just the way one 
culture provides a social arena for a universal drive. It would still be true 
that certain institutions appear in certain cultures and not in others. That 
fact is the key to the method I am proposing, to enable us to get from 
observable characteristics of a culture to underlying values. 
When I have asked social scientists about values, they have usually told 
me to look to the institution. The concept of cultural values seems to be 
somewhat suspect today among sociologists and anthropologists. They 
seem discouraged by the existence of contradictory values within the same 
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societies, particularly complex societies such as ours, but they agree that 
institutions themselves have value systems. Being a humanist, and so 
perhaps less dismayed by the messy complexities of behavior in complex 
societies, I have taken what they say about institutional value systems as 
a clue to how one might tackle cultural values. 5 I should think that the 
values one finds within a given institution could be divided into various 
headings, and I have suggested these headings in the chart: those peculiar 
to the nature of the institution; those related to our "universals" about hu-
man nature; and those shared by other institutions within the culture. 6 To 
use our example of the cannery once again, it might be, for example, that 
the people who operate it could be shown to associate such values with it as 
profit, enterprise, power, service, perhaps even creativity. And since the 
place is a cannery, they might also stress fairly specialized values, such as 
cleanliness, uniformity and efficiency. Even aesthetic considerations might 
appear; they might get more than commercial pleasure out of producing 
plump-looking peas of the right shade of green in an attractively designed 
can. Moreover, they might regard their executive roles as creative or even 
artistic; I have no doubt that many businessmen play upon their organiza-
tions as upon an organ. Now, some of these things might appear only in the 
value systems of given people within the cannery. An assembly-line 
worker might feel very different than does a given cannery executive, so 
one would have to be fairly careful in defining whose values were under dis-
cussion. But I think that once such a definition were made, it would be 
relatively easy to arrive at a list of values. 
On the right-hand side of Figure 1 are a series of boxes labeled "arti-
facts." The assumption here is fairly simple. Most human institutions 
produce something or leave some sort of record which a student of the 
culture might study, and which might give clues to the nature of the in-
stitution and to its value system. Artifacts, like the institutions which pro-
5 A perceptive editorial reader for American Quarterly notes that in several places this 
essay moves close to areas in which social scientists have done distinguished work, and 
suggests that if my conclusions were reached independently, that point is in itself impor-
tant, and should be mentioned, for it would suggest that certain approaches and con* 
elusions have so much validity that men working from entirely different angles of attack 
would reach them. Such is the case here. He suggests that my argument in this portion of 
the essay be compared to Evon Zartman Vogt, The People of Rimrock: A Study of 
Values in Five Cultures (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1966), to Franz Adler, 'The 
Value Concept in Sociology," American Journal of Sociology, 62 (Nov. 1956), 272-79, 
in Nicholas Reschner, Introduction to Value Theory (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall, 1969), and Harold Fallding, "A Proposal for the Empirical Study of Values," Ameri-
can Sociological Review, 30 (Apr. 1965), 223-33. 
•The same reader (see note 5) suggests that my scheme here "is very close to that of 
Bronislaw Malinowski in his A Scientific Theory of Culture" (A Scientific Theory of 
Culture and Other Essays [Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1944]), and 
again recommends that the reader compare the two. 
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duce them, are observable characteristics. Our pea canning factory, ob-
viously, produces cans of peas. They are good artifacts, worthy of study. 
We might also consider the factory itself, or the entire production system, 
as artifact. This type of artifact could tell us things about the level of 
technology, methods of organization, the economic system, the trans-
portation system and so on. 
In the absence of other evidence, we would have to depend entirely upon 
artifacts, as we do when we try to learn about civilizations of ancient times. 
In studying our own culture, of course, we have access to all manner of data. 
If we want to know what a manufactured item is used for, for instance, we 
can ask and find out. But I include artifacts on the chart because I want to 
suggest that it is wise, in culture studies, to attain the kind of detachment 
which an archaeologist feels as he studies an ancient piece of pottery. We 
are surrounded by artifacts of our own culture; it is difficult to see them as 
evidence one could use to describe us. They are, and can help us achieve 
necessary distance and perspective. 
To enable us to move from institutions and artifacts to values and sacred 
values, I propose the following hypothesis: values which recur in a wide 
variety of institutions in a given culture must be either universal—present, 
that is, among all people in all cultures—or somehow "sacred" within the 
culture. They are not merely reflections of the peculiarities of the institu-
tion; they seem rather to be the most highly condoned formulation of the 
world-view by which the culture operates. I am by no means positive that 
this is true, but it does suggest a method for defining and deriving sacred 
values, and the method seems to work. If we examine a wide range of insti-
tutions in our society, and for each do a conscientious job of compiling a list 
of values, then scan the lists to determine patterns of recurrence, I believe 
we will be left with a relatively small number which appear to be basic. 
Which of these one calls "universal" and which "sacred" will often de-
pend on how one defines universal human characteristics, but the distinc-
tion is less important than the fact that a list of recurring items will result. 
If one really wanted to sharpen that distinction, one could repeat the pro-
cedure for the values of other cultures, as diverse and as alien to one 
another as possible, and see which values show up in all. It seems reason-
able to guess that those which always appear are universal. The residue 
would seem to be sacred only in given cultures; they would be different from 
one culture to the next. 
The procedure should be very useful in cross-cultural studies. It should 
also be applicable within a specific society, such as ours, to help us under-
stand the relations between subcultures. I would think that any group in 
our society which seemed to adhere to the list of recurring values could 
safely be labeled "subculture," no matter how different it otherwise ap-
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peared to be from whatever is taken to be "typical" or "characteristic." 
And I would think that if one found a group which did not possess these 
values it could be labeled "alien," even though its members occupied the 
same geographic area. 
I am calling those values which recur "sacred" values, by which I mean 
things which seem so basically true to people in a culture that not only are 
they seldom really challenged, they form a basis of thought and evalua-
tion. One might call them—although the phrase is awkward—the "non-
universal sources of human thought and behavior." You will see that "non-
universal" comes to mean something pretty close to "cultural." 
Let us review this scheme briefly. What I am suggesting is that if we 
add up those values which we find in a wide variety of institutions within a 
given culture, and cross off all of these which do not recur or are con-
sidered universal, we will be left with something which we might call the 
sacred value system of the culture. "Sacred" does not refer in this sense 
to specifically religious institutions or values. It might be, for example, 
that in a culture such as ours, in which religion is often considered to be 
a separate category of human concern and activity, that "sacred" would 
appear to be more sacred (or more basic) than specific values or beliefs 
adhered to by a given religious body. 
An example will perhaps help make this point clear. In Harold Frederic's 
novel The Damnation of Theron Ware, Theron, a naive but gifted young 
Methodist minister, has a conversation with a pair of sophisticated intel-
lectuals, a Catholic priest and a doctor who is a scientific amateur of 
some scholarly standing. "I dare say," says the priest, " . . . that if we 
could go back . . . scores of centuries, we should find whole receding series 
of types of this Christ-myth of ours." Theron's initial reaction is panic; 
he gives "a swift, startled look about the room, the instinctive glance of a 
man unexpectedly confronted with peril and casting desperately about for 
means of defense and escape." His fear, however, lasts for only a mo-
ment, for he recognizes that he is in the room with urbane men who have 
access to a great deal more in the way of "scientific" kinds of knowledge 
than he does. The most sacred (in the religious sense) " t ru th" in his 
religious training has just been challenged, but apparently Theron feels 
that there is a truth even higher. We might say that for him, scientifically 
verifiable " truth" seems more sacred than religious " t ru th ." 
If one went through the analytical process outlined in the "Value Sys-
tem" portion of Figure 1 and succeeded in compiling a list of "sacred" 
values, it might be that one would notice that some of the institutions one 
had used in the course of one's investigation seemed unusually rich in 
"sacred" values and relatively weak in more mundane or "practical" 
values. Let us postulate that one will find in human societies institutions 
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which have as a prime purpose the reinforcement of the most sacred values 
of the culture. They do not exist, if we are right, simply to satisfy mate-
rial or "practical" needs. 
In a culture as complex and diverse as our own, I think it unlikely that 
such sacred institutions will be the same for everyone. Different people or 
groups use different institutions, and I am making an educated guess that 
they will use different sacred institutions. A given American, let's say, 
participates in a large business firm, in two organized social and service 
clubs, in an informal social circle of friends who live in widely separated 
parts of the town, in a church. He makes use also of certain artistic and 
recreational institutions; perhaps he likes certain kinds of music, plays 
golf and follows a favorite football team. His neighbor perhaps is involved 
in not one of the institutions named; he is, let us say, self-employed, dislikes 
lodges and service clubs, socializes primarily with friends in the immediate 
neighborhood, is active only in a political organization, enjoys gardening, 
has no interest in music or religion and, while he never watches football, 
follows his son's high school basketball team avidly. Racial background 
is an important determinant in the list of institutions which a third person 
in the town utilizes. He is, let's say, Chicano, a laborer, socially close 
to a large family of a sort his neighbors do not have; he attends a Catholic 
church, but infrequently, and a neighborhood bar is important to his 
social life. One could go on indefinitely making up patterns of use and 
participation. The student of an isolated tribal culture would have no such 
problems; the more communal patterns of tribal life would provide a far 
more uniform list. 
Given the bewildering variations of our society, it would be extremely 
useful to find key institutions which serve similar purposes for different 
people. If we could determine which of the institutions we use are sacred, 
we would have a useful means of simplifying our examination of values. 
Such a shortcut would be invaluable; the problem of culture study is so 
complicated that any shortcuts are welcome. 
How to determine which institutions are sacred? A tough issue; I can 
do no more than offer some rather speculative criteria. This portion of my 
scheme is frankly tentative. I am by no means sure that it is correct, but I 
can say that it seems to work, to yield results which have been useful to 
me and to my students in figuring out fruitful approaches to cultural 
values. Let me illustrate the kinds of criteria I have used by starting with 
an example far removed from American culture. 
A colleague of mine, not himself an anthropologist, spent a year in 
Australia, much of it with aboriginal people. He came to know several 
aborigines well, and witnessed a number of ceremonies. His observations 
were of interest to anthropologists, and I was present on several occasions 
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when things he had seen were discussed informally. If a ceremony involving 
dancing and totemic objects was used, let's say, to obtain guidance before 
a trip in search of food, or to influence the weather, the professional stu-
dents of such matters would ask for details, and then compare the ritual to 
others they knew in other tribal societies. The ceremonies were certainly 
sacred in that they involved the people's conception of a world guided 
by magic, "influence," the intervention of long dead ancestors, and totemic 
forces. But apparently "sacred" is a relative thing, for these rites were 
clearly practical too, in that they involved everyday needs, food and rain, 
for instance. There was another sort of ceremony for which my friend's 
descriptions seemed less satisfactory. When he asked his aboriginal 
informants for explanations, he could obtain only vague responses, 
statements to the effect of, "It 's hard to explain this one, but if you were 
one of us, and did it, then you would understand." Or, "This is to make 
my grandfather (long dead and associated with a totemic animal) more 
comfortable." Or, "We always do this because it's very good for you." 
One of the anthropologists remarked that one never really "cracks" a 
culture until one understands these most puzzling observances. There 
followed a general discussion of puzzlers one or another of them had en-
countered in field trips, and of whether social scientists aren't overly 
optimistic when they claim to be able to understand alien cultures. A 
consensus opinion was that while any ritual expressed a tribe's belief 
and cosmology, these especially puzzling ones did so in a particularly 
pure form: indeed, that is all that they seemed to do. Even their undeniable 
social and aesthetic aspects were related to the unspoken cultural truths 
of tribal being. Even more than the others, they deserved the label "sacred." 
"Sacred," then, seems to refer to that area which has as its most im-
portant function the expression and reinforcement of basic truths and as-
sumptions. 
A Model for Sacred Value Systems: Where would one look in our 
culture for institutions which seem comparably "sacred"? What we are 
looking for are institutions which are justified in terms rather similar to 
those which the aborigines in the anecdote used to describe their most 
baffling ceremonies. Apparently they should be felt to be good for you, 
but in ways which are a little difficult to define for an outsider. They might 
be expected to build desired traits of personality or to be good in themselves 
simply because of the nature of things. One might look for clues of the 
sort which my friend brought back from Australia: if you asked some-
one who used one of these institutions why he thought it was a good thing, 
he might have to answer you by saying, "Well, that's a little hard to 
describe, but if you were involved in it, you would see." All of this is very 
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v a g u e and quite negative, but it seems to me that the negative quality is 
important . When one deals with things so fundamental that they have be-
c o m e practically a part of personality, one may expect people to have 
t rouble defining them. They key positive test, I would suppose, for sacred 
institutions in our culture is that they serve as a kind of morality play for 
t h o s e recurrent values which we are tentatively labeling "sacred." 
I have been posing this kind of a problem to my classes for the past three 
y e a r s , and we have followed approximately the line of reasoning I have 
described. We began by laying out an overall strategy which we hoped 
would be manageable in scope, then selected a large number of institu-
t ions and compiled lists of values which pertained to each. We tried to 
achieve as much diversity as possible, selecting institutions from areas as 
different as business, industry, government, the arts, athletics and religion. 
W e looked also at the family (through studies of it), to social and service 
clubs and even to institutionalized hobbies. Some were analyzed on the 
largest scale, others through smaller units. Comprehensiveness, of course, 
was impossible to attain; we tried for range. 
Next, we listed the swarm of values we thought we had uncovered and 
crossed off those which seemed peculiar to the nature of given institutions. 
Then we marked off those which did not seem to recur throughout. For 
example, we found basketball coaches talking about "quickness" and 
"speed," values which seem peculiar to certain sports. "Profit" showed 
u p as a value in many institutions, but not nearly in all, so it was marked off 
because it did not recur enough. There was a residue which seemed 
worthy, at least tentatively, of the label "sacred." 
Finally, we went back over the list of institutions and their value systems 
t o see which seemed "pures t" in that they appeared to function largely to 
reinforce the value system. We sought those whose value systems most 
nearly approximated our tentative list of "sacred" values. Undoubtedly the 
group we decided to examine in detail was determined partly because of 
the interests of the students; undoubtedly also our original motivation—to 
develop a firm methodology for using the elite arts in culture study—played 
i ts part in determining items in the list. The group we decided on—orga-
nized athletics, the fine arts, education and research—does not seem to me 
to be all-inclusive by any means, but it seems useful and in some ways 
surprising. Understand that no one is claiming that these institutions 
function as "sacred" for all people in our culture. All that is suggested is 
that they perform a sacred function for those who use them. The reader 
will perhaps think of others which function in a similar manner. Why, one 
might ask, are the elite arts listed, and not popular arts? Are the latter 
not more "representative" because more widely used? For the moment, 
suffice it to say that some of our group did work on more "popular" art 
142 American Quarterly 
forms, but that representativeness seemed less crucial to us than the degree 
of sanction with which institutions operate, and that, besides, we were out 
to discover ways of handling elite arts. The popular arts, so far as we 
t reated them, seemed to follow many of the same patterns as did elite arts, 
but with a far less clearly developed system of sanctions and validations. 
They were also very hard to work with. Still, they are too important to 
ignore, and will be discussed in passing as we go on. 
To make clear how our scheme works, let us discuss the four institu-
tions we examined in detail in terms of the diagram in Figure 2. Figure 2 
is jus t an enlargement of Figure 1. The left side still represents universal 
human characteristics; next, institutions; then, value systems; then, arti-
facts. The scale has been changed to allow more space in which to write 
hypothetical characteristics of the value system of a sacred institution. 
Let us say, for the moment, that the institution with which we are dealing 
is professional baseball. Certainly baseball has some values peculiar to 
itself. These relate largely to techniques and skills involved in the game. 
Then it certainly carries some values which relate to "universals." For 
example, if you believe that it is a universal human characteristic to desire 
to have a strong and gratifying group identification, then this might ex-
plain the satisfaction which fans get from associating with a team. If you 
believe that territoriality is a basic human characteristic, it too may be 
involved; the team might be felt, symbolically, to defend the city it rep-
resents. If your analysis of human character includes some category deal-
ing with the need to engage in combat or conflict, even in a vicarious 
manner, this too might be listed. Note, however, that the institution of 
professional baseball has no "physical" or "practical" relationship to hu-
man needs. It does not can peas or build houses. 7 
When one looks to see how it is justified, one does in fact encounter a 
cluster of values which do recur in other institutions. Achievement, for ex-
ample, is valued. If we hear a story about a very talented ballplayer 
whose career is cut short by an injury, by a scandal in which he was 
tempted, let us say, by a group of gamblers, or by any other sort of mis-
fortune, the story seems to us sad. On the other hand, a story about talent 
which fulfills itself strikes us as happy. These two patterns are so basically 
understood that they form the basis for most of our sports fiction and for 
most of the vast number of articles and books about real sports figures of 
the past. Two basic truths emerge from the patterns: individual talent is 
real; achievement is good. But note that these are cultural, not universal, 
7It does, of course, provide a livelihood for ballplayers and stadium employees. As in 
our pea cannery, values may vary depending on whom in the institution one considers. 
And baseball, like the arts, certainly has an abstract aesthetic dimension to be considered 
also. 
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truths. In many other cultures, basic biographical patterns often are built 
not on a rise in status based upon the fulfillment of talent, but rather upon, 
let us say, achieving harmony within a pre-existing system. 
Speaking on a different topic to a class of mine, Archie Eteeyan, an 
Indian leader from Topeka, provided a fine example of people who do not 
stress achievement or individual talent. His anecdote follows: "You all 
know Indian kids are good at sports. But their parents tell 4em, 'You don't 
want to win by too much. Don't make yourself too big.' So the Indian kid 
runs the race, and he could win by a mile. But he looks back, and he slows 
up, so he won't beat the white kids by too far. When a white kid is fast, you 
see, he goes as fast as he can. He runs against the clock." Mr. Eteeyan 
reinforced his story with anecdotes about the shyness of groups of Indian 
people in formal situations involving whites. The "shyness" is the result, 
often, of each individual's feeling that he should not take upon himself the 
role of leader or spokesman of the group, and is based upon a set of cultural 
values different from those of "anglos." 
Community leaders in major cities will tell one that it is important for 
the city to have a major league team. They couch their arguments not only 
in terms of providing entertainment for the citizens, but more importantly 
in terms of a kind of status which it is felt the presence of a team, especi-
ally a successful team, confers upon the community, and by implication, 
upon all of its citizens. One scores points in heaven, somehow, by having 
a team. Indeed, one often is made to feel that one has a duty to attend some 
games, even if the team is having a poor season. 
If individual achievement is stressed, so is "teamwork," a rather complex 
concept which seems to me to embody some very b^sic facets of the post-
Renaissance western mind. An organization of almost any sort is felt to be 
properly structured when it is made up of a number of highly skilled 
specialists whose functions are neatly compartmentalized, yet who can 
and do function together as a team. The idea is so basic that we seldom 
think of it as an idea. It simply strikes us as reasonable to approach any 
problem through analysis—that is, by breaking it down and attacking each 
phase of it through specialized techniques. Baseball, along with many 
other sports, might be thought of as a morality play for this process. 
Related to specialization and achievement is "dedication" or "involve-
ment." A coach or another member of a team will often praise a player for 
his dedication, which seems to mean his devotion to the process of perfect-
ing specialized skills. It is something good one can say about a boy whose 
athletic talents are not otherwise notable. I was struck by the manner in 
which this same quality was stressed in a very different situation, not 
involving sports, when I attended a meeting of a regional Harvard College 
Schools Committee. Our job is to encourage promising high school 
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seniors to apply for admission to Harvard. The agent with whom we met 
reported to us the criteria which the Admissions Office uses, and "involve-
ment" or "dedication" was stressed. " I t may not mean much that a boy 
was president of his class. But if he organized a discussion group in his 
church, founded a literary magazine in school, worked in a political 
campaign, made himself an accomplished musician—that shows dedication, 
and they are liable to let him in." 
Foreigners who are taken to baseball games, or Americans who are not 
fans but who go to games with friends who are, frequently find the excite-
ment generated in fans by a baseball game inexplicable. Outsiders and 
critics frequently speak of the need to "speed the game up" to make it 
more exciting. Non-fans find the constant flow of statistics from radio 
announcers deadly boring. The fan, characteristically, has a difficult time 
explaining why it is that baseball excites him. He is liable to say something 
like, "If you really knew the game and really followed a team through a 
season, then you would see how exciting it is." This is a valid observation; 
the more one knows of the subtleties of the game and of the "statistics" 
which attach themselves, like Homeric epithets, to individual players, 
the more exciting a given situation in a game becomes. For the devoted 
fan, there are so many things to be kept in mind at any given instant in the 
course of the game, that the pace seems almost too rapid; to him it seems 
that dozens of meaningful dramas are being enacted all at once. But 
you will note how much his basic explanation of why the game attracts him 
sounds like the explanation my friend reported when he asked the aborigine 
about the significance of the sacred ceremony. 
There are difficulties raised by discussing sports institutions in this 
manner. For one thing, the attitudes of those who participate in them may 
be quite different from those of people who are simply spectators. Ob-
viously, as we have noted, not everyone in our society is deeply interested 
in one or another of the large organized sports. Given fans, moreover, 
will also value given characteristics which may not be important to others. 
One is familiar with coachly remarks about how sports build the com-
petitive spirit. If one believes that building competitive spirit is a proper 
enterprise, sports serve to dramatize that value. But it is certainly possible 
to be a fan without seeing competitiveness as a good in itself. And one might 
want to differentiate between the ability of these sports to produce what 
might be termed "desired psychological s ta tes" and the reasons for whicb 
they are valued. "Desired psychological s ta tes" is an especially tricky 
concept. It is easy enough to observe that fans enjoy being excited, absorbed 
or gratified, that "root ing" involves psychological release of some sort, 
and so forth. One might speculate about whether all cultures produce 
institutions which allow behavior of this sort. If they do, it would suggest 
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that the needs which this behavior satisfies are in fact universal, not 
cultural. But the desire for these psychological states is generally a different 
thing from the manner in which support for the athletic institution is 
rationalized. It is the difference between saying, "I t makes me feel good," 
or "It lets me get away from it all" and saying, to pick some of the varying 
statements one will hear from different people, "Athletics build strong 
bodies and strong minds," "Athletics develop leadership qualities," or to 
pick a more sophisticated comment made by a social scientist who is also a 
sports fan, "Athletics provide an arena for certain experiences which the 
society values elsewhere." This might be called "the playing fields of 
Eton" thesis. 
One can draw the same sort of distinction in examining American reli-
gious behavior. Organized religion poses difficult problems for the student 
of the sacred in our culture, perhaps because both its nature and its status 
have changed so dramatically and rapidly during our national experience, 
and because it is used in so many ways by different Americans. My own 
students seldom think to mention it during discussion of sacred institutions; 
undoubtedly for many other people, however, it is most important, and 
probably does serve to reinforce sacred (in our special sense) values. I 
bring it up here to suggest that the same distinction between desired 
psychological states and rationalizations which we noted in discussing 
baseball seems to apply: concern for moral guidance or for personal salva-
tion are different from the more aesthetic effects of participating in and 
observing ritual, or of singing, though in theory they are supposed to be 
related. It is also true that for given individuals the church is more impor-
tant for the social status which affiliation and attendance bring than for 
either of the other reasons. Note, however, that the association of social 
status with church membership is not necessarily incompatible with the 
other reasons. A person who has changed his affiliation from Baptist to 
Episcopal might have done so because he felt he had "arrived" socially, 
because he found himself theologically in better agreement with his new 
church, because of the physical proximity of the church building, or be-
cause its service gave him more pleasure. All four might apply, with or 
without apparent hypocrisy. 
We are not going to discuss religion as a sacred institution. The topic is 
too complex for the present study, and I especially want to avoid analysis of 
the peculiar obsession with salvation which characterizes so much of the 
history of Christian sects. I mention the subject as a reference point, to 
suggest that its uses, like those of athletics or the arts, could be divided into 
the ideological, the social and the psychological. 
I would suggest that the elite arts are another area which we might tenta-
tively label "sacred." We who believe in the elite arts all feel, for example, 
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that Los Angeles or Kansas City or Toledo ought to have a major sym-
phony orchestra. As in the case of organized athletics, one can probably 
break down the reasons for this feeling into two general categories. On the 
one hand, for music lovers there is the matter of the "desired psychological 
state" which listening to music is felt to produce. On the other, there is a 
wide range of reasons which will vary from person to person. 8 For some 
people, presumably, the art is valued primarily in terms of status—"a 
major league city ought to have a major league orchestra." Related is the 
idea that it is good to be "cultured," or to be associated with a place or 
group which supports cultural events. The university where I teach supports 
composers in residence, and though it's difficult to find anyone who has 
ever heard any music which they have written, no one thinks it a scandal 
that the State of Kansas pays their salaries. It does not strike us as strange 
that a nonprofit organization devoted to the dissemination of inexpensive 
recordings of concert music should speak of its product as "ennobling." 
The undergraduate who has an elective space in his program and who has 
noticed that some of his friends dig one or another of the fine arts is 
frequently moved to take an introductory survey himself. His decision 
may be understood as social change, even if he does not show off the 
knowledge he has acquired, in that sociologists now recognize that in a 
society in which large numbers of people fall within a middle range of 
income, social class to some extent must be determined not by income 
alone, but also by such variables as style of life and taste. But the student 
who picks up a taste for a new elite art feels that he's become a better per-
son in the process. Now there are all kinds of variables which he may ex-
press which affect the art he chooses. He may speak of contemporaneity 
(which may lead him to cinema), or he might insist on looking at black 
art because he feels it more "relevant" for himself as a Negro, but there 
is not much variation in what he willsay that it does for him. 
Let me list a number of different ways in which our feelings manifest 
themselves. In each, one notes that art is felt to be a separate and discrete 
realm of activity, one that is good for the individual and one which reflects 
merit on the society which produces it. This seems to be true whether or 
not one believes that the government should do more in support of the 
humanities and the arts in general. One frequently hears arguments from 
the analogy of European governments, which underwrite cultural pursuits 
rather more extensively than ours does. You will find some people who 
"Some years ago the author did a study of the development of tastes among concertgoers 
which covers many of these matters in some detail: Stuart Levine, "Some Observations 
on the Concert Audience," in The American Culture / Approaches to the Study of the United 
States, ed. Hennig Cohen (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1968), pp. 296-311. Sec esp. the post-
note on p. 311. 
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say that the arts should not be artificially supported; that any art, such as 
opera or concert music, which cannot pay its way in the marketplace, 
should be allowed to die, that the arts which are truly meaningful to our 
culture are those which naturally pay their own way—cinema, the various 
forms of commercial music and so forth. But then they will argue that these 
arts arc performing the proper functions of arts in the society and doing 
the same job which the advocate of the elite arts feels that his arts perform. 
The idea that art is special and worthy is not challenged. Like the Austral-
ian aborigines, in short, we get pretty vague when asked to explain what our 
"sacred" institutions are for, and wind up revealing what we really believe 
we and the world around us should be like. 
I came across a passage in Cash's Mind of the South in which this very 
good intellectual historian said that the true measure of the worth of a 
society is the quality of its artistic and philosophical production. Because 
he felt that the South, in the period under discussion, had produced 
practically nothing in these fields, he concluded that southern society 
was not worth much. Now I certainly don't want to put myself in the posi-
tion of defending the antebellum South, nor do I want to single out Pro-
fessor Cash for castigation. The attitude he expresses is extremely com-
mon, and could be found overtly or covertly in almost any intellectual 
historian, among many American Studies practitioners and, for that 
matter, among any in our society who value the humanities as well. My 
point is simply that the attitude is extraordinarily widespread, and that 
it is not a universal truth. It is peculiar, for the most part, to modern west-
ern cultures. 
A rather ugly joke which circulates among my American Indian friends 
might help illustrate its cultural nature. I think I first heard the story from 
the anthropologist Nancy Oestreich Lurie, but I have been told it several 
times since, and it seems unusually good evidence of the prevalence of the 
idea that the arts bestow merit on the groups which produce them: A 
Wack youngster and an Indian kid are arguing. The black kid says, " W h o 
ever heard of a famous Indian musician or baseball player?" (Note the 
choice of fields, by the way—they're both what Tve suggested as " sac red" 
areas.) "Why don't you Indians get on the stick and make some contri-
butions?" To which the Indian is supposed to respond, "Ever see anyone 
play cowboys and niggers?" The black youngster, you see, buys the idea 
that you score points in heaven by producing art. The Indian kid, whose 
culture is not ours, does not. 
A corollary of what I've said about the place of the arts in the culture is 
that we understand them as a separate entity. When a Navajo sand painter 
produces a sand painting and an elite critic sees it, we are liable to get 
praise of the boldness of the conception, the striking stylization, the 
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symbolic abstraction, the sure use of the medium, the thrusting hori-
zontals and the juxtaposed diagonals. Our critic, in other words, sees it as 
an art work, and brings to bear on it the procedures in which he has been 
trained for evaluating art works. The Navajo doesn't see it that way at all. 
Characteristically, the sand painter was called in to cure an ailing child. 
To him the painting and the act of producing it are at once art, religion, 
medicine, magic and science. He does not separate them because his cul-
ture does not separate them. Sensitive writers from Thoreau to Marshall 
McLuhan have been pointing out to us that one of the peculiarities of our 
culture is that we compartmentalize and specialize. Most non-western 
cultures do not; they see the universe, man and the supernatural as an 
organic whole. One can relate this to all manner of peculiarities in post-
Renaissance western culture—our belief in achievement (specialization 
is a very good way to produce achievement), the fact that universities are 
divided into schools and departments, or our characteristic way of ap-
proaching any problem—the process which involves hypothesis and in-
vestigation. "Research" is probably the sacred area which enacts this 
process. 
It is probably a good idea to point out that in taking the position that our 
feelings for " research" or "expanding the frontiers of knowledge" are cul-
tural, I am not trying to argue that the pursuit of knowledge is unworthy. 
But it seems to me that one of the secrets of doing cultural study of one's 
own culture is to learn to see that things one believes in can be culturally 
determined. 9 One can go on believing in them, as I do. A key test, often 
applied in topics discussed in this essay, is the reaction of foreign visitors 
to our country. It happens that those foreigners with whom I come into 
most frequent contact are exchange students and educators primarily from 
countries in the western world, Latin America and Europe in particular, 
people, in other words, who come from cultures which also share post-
Renaissance concepts regarding the merit of acquiring new knowledge, 
the formulation and validation of hypotheses, the open-minded attitude 
necessary for an honest evaluation of new data, and the other attitudes 
which surround the idea of investigation. Even they are greatly struck by 
the strength with which these ideas appear in American culture. A very 
long and thoughtful letter from a German student of mine now completing 
a graduate degree at a prestigious German university seems especially 
telling. In comparing higher education in Germany and the United States, 
he points to some of the factors one would expect—the continental prac-
tice, for example, of allowing evaluation of the student's competence to 
9John M. Rosenfield makes the same point—that to understand the art of another 
culture, we need to know the values in which it was set, and our own web of values—in 
"The Arts in the Realm of Ideas," Daedalus, 98 (Summer 1969), 837-43. 
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ride not on the day-by-day or week-by-week performances in classroom 
situations, essay reports and so forth, but, for the most part, on a series of 
examinations following the completion of a body of work which the stu-
dent for the most part does on his own. He says that while this would seem 
to promote greater freedom and flexibility, in point of fact, students feel 
very strongly that they are operating within a system of knowledge which 
is already fixed. Nothing in his graduate education in Germany, he reports, 
corresponds to the attitude he found again and again in seminars in the 
United States, namely, the professor's assumption that the area which the 
class was investigating was one in which the answers were not fully known, 
that the class had, as a sort of collective enterprise, the task of exploring 
new ground, and the formulation of hypotheses which could then be tried 
out, on appropriate data, through methods which the class itself would 
devise. 
Similarly, an Argentine educator told me that while she felt there were 
a number of extremely distinguished scholars and researchers in numerous 
fields at that nation's most prestigious university, that it succeeded less in 
teaching students "how to think for themselves," "how to lay out a rea-
soned attack upon a problem, and carry it through to completion," than 
did even many of the most modest of American colleges. "The very best 
student thinking," she told me "goes on not at the University [of Buenos 
Aires], but over at the profesorado [a normal school in Buenos Aires]/* 
She told me that I had to come in as a guest lecturer for a few weeks at the 
profesorado to see the difference in the students (I was, at the time, a Ful-
bright professor in Argentina). I followed her suggestion, and can report 
that it is my impression that she was correct. Interestingly enough, the 
profesorado has been much more heavily influenced by the United States— 
in the form of faculty members trained here—than have either the Uni-
versity of Buenos Aires or the University of La Plata, my reference points 
in checking the validity of her assertions. 
It seems clear that the idea that a basic purpose of education is training 
the students to "think for themselves," "to develop the ability to formu-
late a problem and design a manner in which to attack it," is closely related 
to the ideals that motivate research. It is assumed that the procedures of 
research are valuable even for those who will never use them to make 
actual contributions to the world of ideas. Exposure to them makes one a 
better citizen, more rational, more able to cope with the decision-making 
process in any area of human life, less vulnerable to dead ends and frustra-
tions. This argument, along with the one about pushing back the frontiers 
of knowledge, must also be understood as part of that portion of our value 
system which justifies what I would like to call intellectualism. But, as we 
will see when we come to discuss ways of visualizing the structure of our 
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value system, ideas such as thinking for oneself, making one's own deci-
sions and so forth, can also be used to justify what one would have to call 
anti-intellectualism, which, curiously, also quite clearly has a place in any 
schematic representation of our system of values. I don't find this fact dis-
tressing; a value system need not be free of contradictions. 1 0 We must 
bear in mind that we are not trying to arrive at a logically consistent philo-
sophical system, but rather to develop a method for describing a system 
which presently exists and which can be observed. 
Perhaps this is just another way of saying that the student of a culture 
who has a grasp on what we are calling its sacred value system ought to be 
able to handle even areas of disagreement in terms of conflicts between the 
corollaries of the same basic values. Many of my students, for instance, are 
currently questioning the wisdom of certain University regulations. Many, 
for example, resent having to take laboratory sciences or mathematics 
courses as part of their graduation requirements. Those who defend such 
requirements say that such programs are valuable even for the student who 
is never going to use them directly because they give him the ability to de-
fine workable procedures to solve complex problems, or because they pro-
duce the kind of mental discipline which is invaluable in handling issues in 
any walk of life. "Nonsense," the students retort, "do you have any evi-
dence to show that people who have had Mathematics 2C function any 
better as historians, as art critics, as politicians, as businessmen?" It seems 
very clear that both sides are appealing to the same set of values in stating 
their arguments. On both sides it is assumed that a certain set of learning 
experiences—though there is disagreement as to the set—will fit pne better 
for coping with life after the formal educational period is completed. 
And on the most basic level, the idea of education in our country seems 
related to what most of my students agree is the single most fundamental 
value in our sacred value system, a value which they variously call "the 
orderly universe" or "process." Both a humanist, who would subscribe to 
the set of ideas we have discussed in explaining how the elite arts are justi-
fied, and the scientist, whose ideals might most readily be approached 
through the concept of research, in other words, agree that the proper 
functioning of a society depends upon the success of the educational struc-
ture to inform and to teach methods of clarity in thought which work be-
cause the universe is susceptible to rational analysis. I am deliberately 
, 0Ralph H. Turner writes, "Only when social values may he called upon to support con-
tradictory patterns of behavior in actual situations can we speak of social disorganiza-
tion" "Value-Conflict in Social Disorganization/' Sociology and Social Research, 38 
(May-June 1954), 301-8. I think he assumes that value systems "ought to be" a little 
more consistent than they ever are. It is difficult to conceive of a society in which values 
would not be available to justify both sides of a dispute. 
152 American Quarterly 
stating this in very vague and general terms in order to avoid the many 
debates possible within these basic values. I particularly want to avoid 
that kind of debate which centers around our ability ultimately to make 
human behavior and motivation rationally understandable and even pre-
dictable. Both sides of that debate, it seems clear to me, are carried out 
through the framework of the same values. 
Some Sacred Values: The set of values listed below was derived in 
the following manner. First, a group of institutions was identified and 
tentatively labeled " sac red" through the process of reasoning just de-
scribed. Artifacts of each were examined, using for the most part the 
traditional tool of content analysis. "Values" were defined somewhat 
loosely as "things which are fundamentally t rue ," "attitudes which it is 
felt desirable to inculcate," "goals which are unquestionably worthy" or 
"directions in which we should, ideally, be moving." There are some 
semantic difficulties here; obviously, a value is not necessarily the same 
thing as a goal or a t t i tude . 1 1 But it was felt desirable to spread the net 
fairly widely and then to derive recurring values by boiling down the da ta , 
by seeing what our evidence from various sources had in common, ra the r 
than beginning with a tentative list of values which we expected to find. 
An idea would be considered a value only if it kept showing up consistently 
in place after place, and only if it seemed so basic as to be insusceptible o f 
contradiction. 
The list of institutions tentatively identified as sacred—the elite a r t s , 
organized athletics, higher education and "research"—is not in a n y 
sense intended to be comprehensive. There was a fair degree of cer ta in ty 
that each of the institutions named was felt by its "users" to be a ve ry 
good thing, deserving of support, and exemplary of characteristics which 
were felt to be desirable. The reader will notice that our procedure follows 
very closely the model suggested in Figures 1 and 2. 
The "art ifacts" examined were the following: in the elite arts, a w i d e 
variety of surveys of the histories of the different arts (somewhat a r b i -
trarily limited to the ar ts in the United States) from a number of differ-
ent periods. We looked at early surveys of American literature, pa in t ing , 
architecture and music, at surveys written late in the 19th century, e a r l y 
in the 20th century, and within the last two decades. We also e x a m i n e d 
critical studies of different arts written at varying periods, and finally 
looked to contemporary newspaper and magazine accounts which r a n g e d 
l lGood definitions of "values" and related concepts appear in Mr. Turner's e s s a y 
cited above. He is commendably sensitive to difficulties which result from mistaking t h e 
absolute formulation typical of values for the actual behaviorally relevant content of t h e 
values (p. 306). 
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from reviews of specific events to commentaries about the state of a given 
art in a given period or place. Particular attention was paid to the process 
by which standard canons have been established in each of the arts, on 
the theory that the "validation process" would be an unusually good place 
to see the basic values at work in a period. The "validation process" is 
the process by which is decided which are the "major" or "important" 
works or art ists . 1 2 No attempt was made to follow good sampling proce-
dure. The early studies of the arts in America are small in number, and 
it was possible to examine almost all of them. But the number of works on 
the arts in America multiplies astronomically in the 20th century, espe-
cially in the field of literature, so the means of selection was pretty much 
catch-as-catch-can. 
To gain a foothold in higher education, we decided to use the introduc-
tory sections which appear in most college catalogues in which a state-
ment is made of the ideals of the institution. The first time we tried this, 
we made no attempt to achieve a good random sample. The idea grew out 
of a class discussion, and we simply decided to send each student off to the 
library to examine half a dozen catalogues of colleges and universities of 
"varying sorts." We checked only to be sure that there was no duplication 
of schools. I tried the idea again a semester later using a properly de-
signed random sample. We took a list of higher educational institutions in 
the United States, decided that each student would handle half a dozen, 
multiplied the number of students in the class by six (there were ten 
students), divided the number of institutions by sixty, selected a random 
starting place in the list and went to work on our sample. Results were 
substantially the same as in the first go-round. 
The procedure for organized athletics was far less systematic. A col-
league is currently doing a study of values in college and university ath-
1 2Mr. Rosenfield argues, "In our country, clearly, there is no agreement on a single, 
fundamental value system by which we judge what is good and bad in the arts (The Arts 
in the Realm of Ideas,' p. 839)." Our findings suggest that there is a clearly understood 
group of sacred values which are always used to "validate" what is good and reject what is 
not. But the values themselves are not a logical system; the same work can be both vali-
dated or rejected through judgments based upon the same group of values. We were 
repeatedly impressed with the relative stability of the group of values. Even when critic 
A praises a work which critic B despises, critic A rarely attacks critic B's values. Instead, 
he typically applies a different condoned value, one which can be used to praise the work. 
For example, the Hudson River landscape painters for years were considered unimpor-
tant: their work was not technically innovative; they pioneered no sweeping changes in 
world art history, etc. Their works are currently studied seriously because "they accu-
rately expressed national feeling for nature and the American environment." Indeed, new 
evidence sometimes makes possible praise based on the same values previously used to 
condemn: the same painters "innovated curiously in adapting a bird's-eye point-of-view 
quite unique in the history of landscape painting." Innovation, indigenousness and 
innovation again, in this example, are used to evaluate the same works. 
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letic departments; his results will be interesting to see. What I did was 
simply suggest to the students that they examine a wide variety of sports 
material from newspapers, magazines and sports publications. Several 
students transcribed the comments of radio and television announcers 
during sports events. The results were pooled informally in a round-table 
situation. 
Our approach to "research" was deliberately limited. Certainly an 
investigator concentrating on this problem would want to include material 
from a wide range of research institutions. Because time was limited, we 
decided to examine introductions to the concept of research method 
which are presented to college undergraduates. And so we looked at pref-
atory material and at lead chapters of textbooks in elementary courses 
in the sciences and social sciences. 
This description of procedure is intended to reveal frankly the tentative 
nature of much of our data. It would be fair to say that our work in the 
arts was far more thorough than our rather arbitrary samplings of ma-
terial from other areas. To put the matter informally, all we were trying 
to do was to see whether our hypothesis about values, "sacred" values 
and "sacred" institutions seemed workable. And it would be a fair assess-
ment of the current state of this line of investigation to conclude that, as 
of now, the idea seems fruitful. Values recur; the institutions at which we 
looked seem to stress the recurring values. It is time now to discuss the 
values themselves. 
The values which we derived from the study recurred frequently enough 
for us to be quite certain that they are felt to be basic, and, in the special 
sense of the word, "sacred." We were unsure, however, of how relation-
ships between them should be indicated. All are closely related, and some 
seem to be corollaries of others, but it is hard to tell which are mos t 
"basic," or where one concept leaves off and another begins. The mos t 
satisfactory model I have seen was one prepared by a student in my 
class (see Figure 3). It worked better than any of the others we were able t o 
create, and so I present it here with the comment that all of us (including 
the student who developed it) were able to see things that were wrong with 
it, areas in which the ranking is relatively arbitrary, and so forth. 1 3 Def-
inition of some of the terms used in it would be in order before discussing 
the chart. But one should bear in mind that the definitions will themselves 
overlap. 
""The arranging of values in hierarchies of importance is an effort to conceive in rational 
terms the situational specificity of values'* (Turner [see note 10], ibid.). Turner is de-
scribing why people, in arguments, want to rank values. What we were about was quite 
different: we were not trying to settle a dispute, but to group, in a systematic manner, 
values we had found operating in our "sacred'1 institutions. 
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Figure 3. An Arrangement of Sacred Values. 
1. Orderly Universe 
or 
Process 
9. Fair Play 
10. Individual Potential 
11 . Talent or Genius 
12. Sel f Express ion 
13. Creativity 
8. Meliorism 2. "Truth" 
3. Objectivity 
4. Broadest view possible 
5. Knowledge 
6. Education 
14. Innovation 
1 5. Diversity 
16. Indigenousness 
17. Naturalness 
18. Humanitarianism 
1). Orderly universe. The world is taken to be comprehensible in its 
structure. Although my students were well aware of the persistence in our 
culture of occult means for understanding the universe, they nowhere 
encountered, in the material examined, points of view contradictory to the 
idea that the world is put together through a series of comprehensible 
bonds and processes. Indeed, the student who produced the chart 
considers "process" synonymous as a value with "orderly universe." Some 
students put it differently; in the words of one, this is the belief that "ra-
tional thought works." Faced with something we do not understand, we 
apply certain processes which we call collectively "rational thought," and 
the procedure is supposed to work. It might be a fair critique of our entire 
study to say that our culture, on the sacred level, thinks of itself (if a cul-
7. Specialization 
Compartmentalization 
Intellectualism 
19. Sanctity of Human Life 
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ture can be said to think) as a rational entity, and that all we have done is to 
spell out the tenets of that rationality. Perhaps, quite by accident, we will 
end by deriving Descartes from the texture of our own artifacts. 
2) Truth. If the process derived from (1) is applied properly, and ade-
quate information is available, truth will result. We may be sure truth is 
real, replicable, susceptible of scientific testing and verification. It is also 
"good" and an end in itself. Moreover, the process by which it is found and 
confirmed seems to outrank all other processes in sacredness. Its sacred-
ness is revealed in prototypical story patterns which could be said to serve 
the function of myth. If someone recounts the story, let us say, of how the 
Catholic Church reacted to the work of Copernicus and Galileo, we all 
respond by feeling that the Church was wrong to attempt to suppress 
" t r u t h . " If we encounter someone who does not perceive the sacredness 
of t ruth or of the process on which its establishment rests, we assume that 
he is inadequately educated; the process itself will cure him. 
3) Objectivity. The ideal attitude for those in quest of truth. It is also 
good, in the quest, to achieve 
4) The broadest view possible. This means considering as much reliable 
data as can be gathered. 1 4 And this is the reason that 
5) Knowledge is good in itself. It "expands human horizons," though 
in acquiring it, one may not immediately see its utility, and it may be 
dangerous if misapplied. The process of acquiring it, however, is good for 
one; it builds proper mental and even moral attitudes, and increases one's 
personal worth. Moreover, one never can tell to what good uses any 
knowledge may be put by future investigation. Participating in the pro-
cess is honorific and self-fulfilling. The process is at the heart of educational 
theory. Thus all open-minded and dedicatedly-supervised 
14American Quarterly's commentator, in suggesting that I devote further space to 
"demonstrating that each of the sacred institutions . . . does in fact manifest the values 
listed," asks, as an example of the sort of questions he has in mind, "just how does the 
'broadest view possible" manifest itself in athletics?" I can think of any number of ways on 
any number of institutional levels in sports. A few examples will have to suffice: 1) It is 
"cutting time," and the coaching staff in any team sport meets to decide which players must 
be dropped from the squad to meet league regulations. By which criteria should the staff 
attempt to make its difficult decisions? 2) It is late in a baseball game, men are on first and 
third with one out, a good left-handed batter is due up, and the pitcher, who is most effective 
against right-handed batters, is clearly tiring. With the ace reliever complaining of a sore el-
bow, the pitching rotation skewed by a busy schedule and a 17-inning game yesterday, and 
with a crucial double-header scheduled tomorrow, by what criteria should the manager, 
with a one-run lead (one could, and indeed should, go on listing factors to be considered), 
make his decision on whether to pull his starter? Or position his infield? 3) You are seated 
in a greasy bridge-chair in the cluttered interior of a gas station and sundry shop in a small 
town waiting for a flat to be fixed, and the "old boys" in wool plaid jackets who use the 
place as a club are discussing the teams involved in recent and not-so-recent World Series 
with an eye to determining which showed the most overall strength. By what criteria do they 
press their cases? 
Arts, Values, Institutions and Culture 157 
6) Education is good. It puts students in touch with the great traditions 
of human learning, and enables them to feel it possible to play a role in 
expanding outward the "frontiers of knowledge," or in improving the 
human condition (see 8, Meliorism). One's sense of role here seems to be 
the equivalent of what other societies achieve through their basic reli-
gious myths. One can feel that one is playing a part in the process even if 
one's life work is humble, for one can feel that one's work supports 
the process, if only by making it possible for others to play loftier roles. 
7) Specialization, compartmentalization and intellectualism are nec-
essary. They accelerate the process, but they carry with them the dangers 
of narrowness and other-worldliness. The specialist's education should 
be broad enough to counter these dangers, but even the comically narrow 
specialist may make a great contribution to "progress" or "human better-
ment." 
8) Meliorism. The most basic "radical" concept in the value system. 
It is assumed that it is within the power of man to alter and improve human 
institutions, and that this alteration can favorably affect the quality of 
human life and even human personality. To me it seems that this value 
more than any other distinguishes our perception of the world from that 
of the other cultural complexes. A radical student who lives in a commune 
told me that his decision to live there was an attempt to get outside "the 
whole rotten value system," to live in an atmosphere of honesty, direct-
ness, simple "natura l" emotional experience, recognition of individual 
worth and so on. To me it seemed, first, that the things he named as 
good were completely within the value system in its most "sacred" sense, 
and second, that the idea of changing and redesigning a social institution 
as basic as the family could only occur to someone who believed fer-
vently—as most young radicals do—in the idea of meliorism. 
For clarity, it might be worth mentioning that meliorism is by no means 
exclusively an American idea—none of these values is. We share it, for 
example, with all communists; Marx is nothing if not a meliorist and a 
believer in "process." So, by definition, are all socialists, political theorists 
and reformers. If there is a peculiar national flavor to our versions of the 
sacred values of western culture, it may be the result of the extremely 
broad base on which our national commitment to meliorism rests. One 
finds it in the literature of the near and far left, to be sure, but it is no 
less prevalent in the literature of the extreme right which I have exam-
ined. It is an issue on which an SDSer and a Bircher would agree: changes 
(of the right sort) would make things better. Rather than escapees from 
the value system, the more serious young radicals, hippies and social 
experimenters seem to me self-conscious but often sincere missionaries, 
holy hermits and saints to what is most "sacred" in our value system, call-
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ing us not to escape from it, but rather to live up to it. It is not surprising 
that their heroes in our intellectual history—Thoreau and Whitman es-
pecially—are men who quite consciously set out to play the roles, re-
spectively, of radical saint and bard to the most sacred values of the cul-
ture, especially meliorism (Thoreau's redesign of human institutions is a 
sort of one-man Utopian community, or, if you will, a one-man commune) 
and to the group of values which follow. 
9) Fair play. A parallel idea to objectivity. It is to human relationships 
what objectivity is to intellectual pursuits. Just as bias, prejudice or un-
equal manipulation of information are felt to impede the quest for truth, 
so "unfair" treatment of people is felt to impair the proper operation of 
society or human institutions. Violations of fair play are bad because 
10) Individual potential must be allowed to express itself. Any man, 
regardless of his heredity or social status may possess 
11) Talent or Genius. These are felt to be real, and society is at fault to 
the extent that it thwarts their maximum creative expression. Indeed— 
and here we come to the reason that the arts and the other areas we have 
named are probably "sacred"—one ultimately judges the worth of a so-
ciety on the number of great creative figures it produces and encourages. 
Much of our fiction, biography, autobiography and, on a humbler level, 
sports literature is based on a moral pattern which can be described very 
simply: the story is sad if talent or genius is thwarted; it is happy if genius 
thrives and creates. That pattern has to be a basic myth of our culture. 
Corollary to (11) are belief in (12-15). 
12) Self-expression. Since each man is unique, he should express his 
"real self" or fulfill his personal potential. 
13) Creativity. In any field, this is taken to be a sign not only of innate 
capacity but of mental health. It is taken to be almost a desired trait of 
personality, and is sanctioned as such. Institutions or people which thwart 
it are felt to be bad and in need of alteration or education. 
14) Innovation. This is a corollary not only of the fair-play complex of 
values, but also of the orderly universe-process complex. Innovation is 
valued not only because each "contributor" is unique, and thus should do 
something different, but also because each field is understood as a process, 
which should progress. 
Although, as I said, these values overlap to the extent that any attempt to 
name them is somewhat arbitrary, and an attempt to explain how they are 
felt to be related involves what looks like circular reasoning, a discussion 
of them is not simply an exercise in tautology. The values are not universal; 
they are cultural. Innovation is not universally valued. Within the African 
culture which produces it, the carved wooden object is not valued for the 
individual expression and innovation which the carver brings to it (though 
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we may value it, or him, for such reasons). It is valued because it has the 
correct characteristics. He made it right, and it therefore performs the 
right religious function. When, earlier in the 20th century, a Hopi village 
lost the last old man with the proper clan membership, power and knowl-
edge to create certain ritual objects and conduct an important ceremony, 
it delegated the job to a tribesman who endeavored with great conscien-
tiousness to perform the tasks properly. He fasted, prayed, purified him-
self, made the objects and conducted the ceremony. It failed to work; the 
rains did not come, the crop failed, the people starved. We might praise 
him for his creativity and innovation; the objects he produced might 
seem very beautiful to us. But he knew with some bitterness that he had 
failed to do his task correctly; our values, innovation, personal expres-
sion and creativity, would seem totally irrelevant to him. 
15) Diversity. If change ("process") is felt to be normal, if innovation is 
sanctioned, and if each individual is felt to be unique, diversity will also be 
sanctioned, as I believe it is on the "sacred" level of our value system. 
Once again we are dealing with an area of concern to rebels-against-the-
system, one of whose credos is "Do your own thing." Once again, how-
ever, it seems clear that the radical ideology is rooted in the sacred value 
system. It would be an incomprehensible slogan in a society which did not 
already carry the family of interrelated values (10-15) which might be 
lumped together under the heading "Individualism." 
16) Indigenousness. Perhaps this is too specialized an idea to merit a 
position in a list of values, but it is felt to be a corollary of the same family 
of values, and since it is important to our feelings about the arts, I want to 
include it. An art form is felt to have a certain intrinsic worth on purely 
aesthetic grounds, but it is looked upon with special favor if it seems to 
grow from the special characteristics of its creators. In numerous fields, 
elite critics at least since the Federal period have called for works which 
grow from the national experience. A "distinctively American" painter, 
composer or novelist is to be especially treasured. The call for regional 
arts was similarly based upon the value of indigenousness. Jazz is valued 
not merely for its quality, but because it is a form which developed here. 
It gains special sanction for being the creation of black Americans. If we 
examine the literature which deals with jazz, from scholarly articles by 
jazz historians to novels and films, we find clear evidence of the relationship 
between indigenousness, worth and value 9, fair play. It is felt to be un-
fair that jazz, created by black musicians "indigenously" out of the grim 
experiences of black life, has brought relatively little fortune to its creators. 
And, to anticipate a point we'll get to in the final section of this essay, 
appreciation of jazz is taken as a sign that one has become in some sense 
"enlightened." 
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17) Naturalness. I am not satisfied with "naturalness" as a name for a 
value, but no other term I can think of is sufficiently broad. The idea o f 
course overlaps (12), self-expression, but also includes sanctioned traits o f 
personality, frankness and openness. It includes as well an idea perhaps 
best stated negatively: anti-hypocrisy. And it can be used to justify anti-
intellectualism, as a basis for an argument that an intellectual approach t o 
a given issue is "artificial" or "phony." 
Intellectualism, however, is also sanctioned under the family of values 
which deal with the orderly approach to the world, with truth, objectivity 
and specialization. This is, perhaps, a good time to repeat the point that t h e 
sacred value system is not a philosophically reasoned, highly logical con-
struct. It is rather a set of principles on which belief seems to be founded 
on the "sacred" level, a set of ideals toward which an "enlightened 
member" of our culture feels all processes should move. Its corollaries 
very often contradict one another when several apply to a given problem. 
Consider the case, for example, of the next corollary of the idea of fair 
play. 
18) Humanitarianism. This seems related to the idea of individual 
worth (10). One wants to help the unfortunate because all men are worthy-
One knows that many people get less than an "equal break"; humanitar-
ianism might be defined as the effort to apply fair play to human relation-
ships. It is related to another sanctioned personality trait, "sympathy for 
the underdog." But there can be a conflict here, for (10), (11), (12), (13) 
and (14) all stress achievement. A football fan thus may feel a conflict 
when watching a game between a weak team and a strong one, loaded with 
"stars." Assuming that neither is the fan's favorite team, and that the o u t -
come of the game does not affect his team's standing, he may find himself 
hoping the stars will shine, while at the same time hoping that the w e a k 
team will somehow win. 
Conflict of a more serious sort can develop when the subject is not a 
"morality play" such as athletics, but "real life." Thus it is possible t o 
argue on humanitarian grounds for government action to prevent rac ia l 
injustice while still feeling the force of a state's rights argument, let us s a y , 
for local determination of school integration policy. Both sides of t h e 
debate are rooted, ultimately, in the concept of fair play—evidence of t h e 
pervasiveness of the sacred value system. The "enlightened" c i t izen 's 
feeling toward the man who used the state's rights argument in this in-
stance would be that prejudice, or inadequate experience, or inadequa te 
education (as in Figure 6) prevent him from seeing that arguments b a s e d 
on human worth, underdog-sympathy and fair play outweigh those b a s e d 
on diversity, individualism and indigenousness, particularly when t h e 
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diversity, individualism and indigenousness of only some citizens are in 
fact being protected. 1 5 
In Figure 3, these values are arranged in what is admittedly an arbi-
trary way, with Process or Orderly Universe at the top as being as near a 
key to the others as could be devised, with those values related to individ-
uals or groups of people set to the left, and those related to knowledge to 
the right. 1 6 Meliorism is accorded a central position because it seems al-
most as much a "given" as "Process"—indeed, process and "progress" 
come close to merging in many of the sources we examined—and because 
it seems to link the two larger groups. 
19) The sanctity of human life also had the quality of being a "given," 
and also seemed best in a central position because of its relationship with 
the two larger groups. It means something special in our culture, and does 
not appear, at least in this special form, in all cultures. 
Herman Melville pinpoints the difficulty for us with terrible precision 
in Moby-Dick when he points out that if we really believed in an afterlife, 
we would not feel so grief-stricken at the loss of loved ones who should be 
going to their eternal rewards. That we are utterly inconsolable shows that 
we really do not believe. Melville, characteristically, follows this pas-
sage with one in which he mockingly reassures us that faith, like a jackal, 
preys amid the tombs and will ultimately overcome even this grief. What 
he is implying, for our purposes, is that belief in the importance of the 
sanctity of human life is corollary to an essentially rational and secular 
view of the universe. 
Since the majority of Americans were trained in a religious world view 
which we can loosely label "Christ ian," it is difficult for them to see that 
Christianity's enormous emphasis on personal salvation is peculiar when 
compared to the position of other world religions. Judaism places relatively 
little emphasis on salvation, and the mystical religions which still occupy 
a majority position among the world's population do not draw nearly as 
1 8Such conflict, obviously, does not have to be so strong as to produce anomie or social 
disorganization (though it can). See note 10 above. 
xtAmerican Quarterly's commentator writes, "This list is . . . very close to the longer 
lists developed by Robin Williams in his chapter on values ["Values and Beliefs in Ameri-
can Society," esp. pp. 469-70] in American Society (New York: Knopf, 1961) and by John 
Gillin in his article "National and Regional Cultural Values," Social Forces, 34 [Dec. 
1955], 107-13. If Levine's list was developed independently of such attempts this would 
be of interest." A very good point (see note 5); it was developed independently. Indeed, 
I have made a conscious attempt to protect my ignorance of studies of values developed 
from other methods, not from hostility to such methods or to the social sciences ("Some 
of my best friends are social scientists"), but in order to avoid prejudicing my thinking and 
that of my students. We wanted to develop our own list; awareness of pre-existing lists 
would probably have influenced our work in that we would have had given values in mind 
before studying our evidence. 
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strong a line between life and death as does Christianity. This is not to say 
that Christian churches may not be functioning for many people in our 
culture as sacred institutions. I believe that for many people they do. It 
does seem to imply, however, that from the point of view of the Christian, 
the sacred values of our culture seem to exert a secularizing influence. I do 
not believe that the game of applying rational and logical criteria to the 
heart of Christian belief has been played in our culture only by gifted 
skeptics like Melville or Mark Twain. It is also a popular sport among 
those of my friends who are ministers, priests, and nuns. 
And, interestingly, even those who attack the secularizing tendencies, 
fundamentalist Protestant clergy, for example, make use of precisely the 
same procedures which are corollary to the list of values listed in Figure 3 
on the right-hand side. We have once again a good example of how conflict 
within a cultural unit can be understood in terms of the corollaries of basic 
values. 
The relationship between secularity and belief in the sanctity of human 
life shows very clearly in an anecdote I read or heard somewhere, and 
which I am perhaps retelling inaccurately—I simply can't remember 
where I encountered it. I am sure that I have the basic outline right: In a 
period of grave drought and food shortage in India, an American attached 
to AID or some comparable agency is working in India with an Indian 
government official to expedite the rapid distribution of American grain 
and other foodstuffs. Time is desperately important; enough data arc 
available to make it clear that unless the food reaches its destination 
very quickly, millions of peoplee will die of starvation. The American is at 
his desk night and day, organizing, arguing, pleading, cajoling. His Indian 
counterpart, highly educated, personally agreeable and a good friend of 
the American, in contrast puts in a normal workday and enjoys his leisure 
time in his customary pursuits. The American endures this sort of be-
havior as long as he can, but finally feels that he must light a fire under 
his friend. He yells at him and tells him that he can't understand how he 
can go about his normal routine in a time of crisis when the lives of millions 
of people depend upon the extra effort he is unwilling to expend. "Don't 
you realize that if we don't get this done in time, two and a half million 
people are going to die?" "Yes," replies the Indian, "people die. Didn't 
you know that?" Death is simply not as tragic in many other cultures as 
it is in ours, and the reasons behind our special feelings about death are 
rooted in our sacred values. 
Some Speculations on Value Change and Social Structure: What good 
to us as Americanists is the procedure outlined in this essay? The pedagogi-
cal answer seems fairly clear: to the extent that I am right in my supposi-
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tions (and I have tried to label as tentative those portions of the argument 
of which I am less than certain), it gives us a firm way to handle the prob-
lem of art and values, and a way of seeing the arts as a group of social in-
stitutions among many. An editorial reader for this journal provides a 
summary of my argument: 
a) (Social) institutions operate in terms of values some of which are "universal" 
and some of which are cultural. 
b) (Cultural) values which recur in all (or most) of the institutions of a society are 
its basic or "sacred values." Actually, they are only "sacred values" if they seem 
basically true and good [on the most condoned level]. Such values form one 
basis of thought, evaluation (and action). 
c) Institutions which are especially loaded with sacred values and/or which can 
be seen as a kind of "morality play" involving these values, and which are not 
devoted to immediate mundane matters can be labeled "sacred institutions." 
d) People are likely to have difficulty explaining the nature of these institutions 
since they are not directed to immediate practical problems and because the 
basic values they embody are largely taken for granted. 
e) Examination of a wide variety of American institutions yielded a list of four 
seemingly sacred institutions. [Others undoubtedly exist.) 
f ) Analysis of the values in these (and other institutions) led to the . . . [preced-
ing] list of "sacred" American values. 
Our method should be useful in a number of ways. It does suggest, for 
instance, a method of determining which segments of our national popula-
tion constitute subcultures (clearly within the ecumene in that the same 
sacred values serve as guidelines) and "alien" cultures (geographically 
American, but with markedly different sacred values). I am not, by the 
way, suggesting these values as a kind of loyalty test, nor in any way endors-
ing the idea that groups such as tribally-oriented Indian people, who, by 
this criterion, seem to me outside the ecumene, should be brought within 
it . 1 7 But the use of the list, or a better one if one can be devised, could 
bring some salutory precision to what has been an exceedingly loose and 
sloppy debate about "rebellion against the whole rotten value system" (the 
"rebels," however, uniformly believing in every sacred value on the list) 
and the separateness of certain ethnic "cul tures" (which seem to me admi-
rable and worthy of "pr ide," but very clearly within the ecumene; subcul-
tures, not alien cultures, laying stress on indigenousness, fulfillment of 
potential and fair play in particular). 
There are large numbers of phenomena in our society which seem based 
on values which obviously are contradictory to the values which we have 
, 7 My ideas on this subject are spelled out in "The Survival of Indian Identity," in 
Stuart Levine and Nancy Oestreich Lurie, The American Indian Today (Baltimore: Pen-
guin, 1970). 
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named and to their apparent corollaries. I do not believe, however, t h a t 
these are "sacred" values. "Sacred" describes concepts which are simply 
true and precepts on which one ought to act. Let me use an illustration. I 
spent a summer in California working with a group of "turned-on" s t u -
dents on this problem of values. One young lady did a paper for me on 
something called "hard rock protest music." She had a tendency to see t h e 
object of the protest as a cultural value, instead of seeing that the song i tse l f 
in its protest was expressing a value which was felt (at least by the song-
writer) to be "truer." For example, if the song complained about s o m e 
form of racial discrimination, she named racism as the value. I would n o t 
argue with her contention that our society is and has been racist, but t h e 
value which the song expresses is the opposite—something which we migh t 
call "fair play." Similarly, a song which complains about conformity c a n -
not in any sense be taken to prove that Americans are conformists. W h a t 
it shows more clearly is that the author of the song believes in individualism. 
There is another, related issue which good students will raise if we do 
not raise it first: it is the matter of direct relevance. What can the study o f 
institutions and values tell us about issues we face? Can it help us to c r e a t e 
models of social processes which will do us any good in deciding where w e 
are, and what we should do? 
It seems to me that the key to constructing successful models of t h e 
American social system is dynamicism. We need dynamic models not so 
much because values change over time (they do, though I think s a c r e d 
values change very slowly) or even that institutions change (they do, too), 
but largely because individuals change, often quite rapidly, as b roadened 
social, intellectual and artistic experiences produce series of crises i n 
beliefs and perceptions, creating "gaps" between geographic, soc ia l , 
ethnic and generational groups. 
I have, as a result of a series of studies my students and I have done* 
hard evidence that such dynamic change is characteristic of the e x p e r i -
ences of individuals who enjoy the various arts, and as this essay w a s 
originally conceived, I took a few pages to speculate about whether s u c h 
changes in taste were analogous to changes elsewhere in our na t iona l 
experience. I asked in effect whether the concertgoer who began h i s 
listening career, say, hostile to concert music, then came to like the f a m i l -
iar high-romantic composers, and whom I had interviewed at a concert o f 
previously unperformed contemporary Belgian chamber music, had n o t 
been influenced in his development by the same sorts of social forces a n d 
the same group of condoned and validated values as, let's say, the e n -
lightened Supreme Court justice who at one stage of his career had b e e n 
a member of the Ku Klux Klan. I think he had; both seem examples o f 
dynamic change on the individual level. Indeed, I would argue that b o t h 
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represent social change as well, and that any social model which cannot 
handle the kinds of change represented is far too rigid to reflect American 
social realities. So the study of institutions and values leads very quickly in-
deed to major issues. 
What I have said in these last paragraphs is not intended as a defense of 
the status quo, nor as a sermon on the virtues of "working within the 
system." I include it because it seems to me that the scholar whose own 
work bears a vital relationship to the world around him is duty-bound to 
point out that relationship to the best of his ability. I do not intend even a 
defense of our sacred value system as I perceive it. But it does seem worth-
while to point out that the tendency to rhapsodize about the beauties of 
cultures very different from our own by way of criticizing ours is silly and 
misinformed. I am not sure cultures can be " ra ted" by any absolute criteria. 
The criteria we are tempted to use are liable to be themselves based upon 
our own cultural value system. An exotic (i.e., foreign) culture seems more 
harmonious than ours, let us say. But it is also smaller, far more homo-
geneous, and so racist that its racism denies even the possibility of the 
humanity of outsiders. Another demonstrates a beautiful blend of art, 
ritual, belief and behavior. But its social structure is rigid beyond our 
ability to endure restraints. No alien culture I can think of will do as a 
model for us; we may learn from them, gain detachment and perspective 
from knowing them, but I fear we shall have to work out our own salva-
tion. To me it seems enormously hopeful that our own values of truth, 
objectivity and fair play have forced us into the present agony of self-
analysis. If we are presently unsure of whether the system is working, we 
may be sure that the value system is. 
